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Case No. 16589 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff seeks to have an agreement reciting and defining 
Defendant-Respondent's interest in real property declared a nullity 
and revoked by the revocation of a revocable trust. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court found that the agreement was valid and bind-
ing on all of the parties; that it was independent of the revocable 
trust; and that it was not revoked. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment 
0
, 
the trial judge. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Respondent agrees with the facts as set forth t. 
Plaintiff, except where Plaintiff characterizes herself as the 
owner of the property in question (because Defendant-Respondent 
claims an interest therein), but feels that the facts, as recit 
by Plaintiff, are incomplete. 
Plaintiff and the Defendant-Respondent Glenwood Larrabee 
entered into an agreement dated September 7, 1973 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 4) which Defendant-Respondent will hereafter refer to 
simply as 'the Agreement. 11 Thereafter Plaintiff made a revocable 
trust agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) which will be referred 
to herein as "the Revocable Trust. 11 The Agreement provided for 
a revocable trust as a means of husbanding the property in ques· 
tion during Plaintiff's lifetime. The Agreement was the culmin' 
tion of a 2-year negotiation with Robert Ryberg representing 
Plaintiff and all of Plaintiff's children, except Glenwood Larr:, 
bee and Gerald E. Nielson representing Glenwood Larrabee. In 
1978 Plaintiff brought suit against Glenwood and the other chiii 
ren as defendants. The other children, being in reality co-
Plaintiffs, did not answer. The complaint alleges the Agreemen: 
was obtained by undue influence and was without consideration a: 
asks that it be declared to be of no effect and cancelled (See 
prayer, R-3). Defendant-Respondent prepared to defend an undue 
. I 
influence-no consideration case. When Plaintiff came to tria_, 
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r:, 
she abandoned both of those claims. She then, with the concurrence 
of Defendant-Respondent, placed in evidence the Agreement (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 4) and the Revocable Trust (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1), 
together with two (2) notices from Plaintiff to Defendant-Respon-
dent regarding the revocation of the Revocable Trust (Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 2 and 3). No other evidence, testimony or written, was 
introduced. Plaintiff then argued that the revocation of the Rev-
ocable Trust had the effect of revoking the Agreement and rested. 
Defendant-Respondent moved for judgment at the conclusion of Plain-
tiff's case and the Court granted judgment for Defendant-Respondent. 
Plaintiff has raised a question as to whether the Trust was 
ever effectuated (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). If it was, Defendant-
Respondent agrees that Plaintiff could and did revoke it. If it 
was not effectuated, as Plaintiff's attorney claims it was not, 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) it could not have been revoked and there 
could have been no revocation of the principal Agreement. 
The issue for this appeal is simply, given the four (4) 
exhibits, without more, could reasonable men have concluded other 
than that the revocation of the Trust revoked the principal Agree-
ment of the parties or, conversely, could the Court reasonably 
conclude that the revocation of the Trust did not revoke the prin-
cipal Agreement? 
Note even if the Court agreed with Plaintiff as to all of 
that, it does not follow that Defendant-Respondent does not have 
an interest in the property. The evidence is that he does have 
such interest. (The second recitation of the Agreement recites 
that Defendant-Respondent had such interest in the property as 
-3-
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a result of his placing substantial improvements th 
ereon PUrsu2· 
to an understanding that he would have the value f th 
o e propert 
in excess of $57,000.00.) If the agreement could be revoked, t: 
interest did not J'ust disappear. The purpose of th e Agreement , 
to define and describe that interest. 
Defendant-Respondent wishes to describe to the Court the: .. 
cumstances of the making and execution of the Agreement (Plaint./ 
Exhibit 4) • There was no evidence on that point, but the tria: 
court was advised as to those circumstances in Defendant-Respc~· 
dent's opening statement (R 101-105). Since there was not evi-
dence, such description or explanation can only be considered,, 
one explanation the trial court might have considered in its de· 
termination that the revocation of the Revocable Trust did not :c 
voke the principal Agreement. 
Those facts are that Defendant-Respondent worked with his 
father in a milk distributing and later an ice cream store and 
restaurant business upon the property in question until his fat: 0! 
died in 1952. Pursuant to a family council with the late Emmet: 
Brown, attorney, the family and particularly Plain tiff agreed:: 
Defendant-Respondent would take charge of the property; pay PlJ 
tiff rent for it; have the increase in value of the property th: 
occurred after that time; and that the residual interest wouM~ 
I 
divided equally among all of the children. (The father had in·' 
tended and willed that the property be divided only among the t:I 
An appraisal was obtained indicating the value at that time was! 
$57,000.00. 
h t in arrears ,. In 1971 there was complaint that t e ren was 
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the demand was made for a return of the property. Plaintiff and 
the children other than Defendant-Respondent, by and through their 
attorney Robert Ryberg, entered into extensive negotiations with 
Defendant-Respondent, by and through his attorney Gerald E. Niel-
son, which resulted in the execution of the principal Agreement 
almost two (2) years later. It was signed by the mother (Plain-
:1 tiff-Appellant) , the Defendant-Respondent and all of the other 
t, 
:C.1 
children. It recited Defendant-Respondent's interest in the value 
of the property because of his improvements on it, pursuant to a 
prior understanding with the family; it provided for the surrender 
by Defendant-Respondent of the possession of the property; it pro-
vided for the repayment by Defendant-Respondent of the past due 
rents and other debts; it provided (and this is not immediately 
apparent from a casual reading of the Agreement) for the benefit 
and income from the property, including Defendant-Respondent's im-
provements on said property, to go to Plaintiff for a minimum of 
five (5) years or until Plaintiff's death whichever was later 
(Plaintiff was 82 or 83 at the time and the minimum of five years 
of benefits was a bargained-for consideration intended to compen-
sate for a prior disparity of the value of the property and the 
rents which it received); it provided for the distribution of the 
property upon Plaintiff's death or after the five years to all of 
her children, after preserving Defendant-Respondent's agreed in-
terest in it; it made it clear that Plaintiff could consume the 
property in her lifetime for her own support, but that she could 
not alter the agreed-upon distribution and that she could not pre-
fer one or more of the children over the others; it provided a 
-5-
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right of first refusal in Defendant-Respondent 
erty upon the death of Plaintiff or a proposed 
to obtain the t· 
. I 
sale; itpro.I Vt.,: 
for mutual releases, indemnification for debts incurred by De:, 
dant-Respondent and payment by Defendant-Respondent of increas,, 
inheritance taxes caused by the improvements attributable to C,I 
fendant-Respondent. It also provided for a revocable trust as 
scheme to manage the property during Plaintiff's lifetime. Th:, 
Revocable Trust was signed approximately two (2) months after: 
Agreement and recites that the distribution per said Trust sha:. 
be modified in accordance with the provisions of the principal 
Agreement. 
Prior to the onset of this lawsuit, Plaintiff gave notice 
her revocation of the Trust (clouded by an assertion that the 
Trust was never effectuated) (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). She the; 
attempted to sell the property without Defendant-Respondent's; 
ticipation. Defendant-Respondent recorded a Notice of Interest 
the property by reason of the Agreement and Plaintiff brought: 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT HAD AN INTEREST IN THE PROP· 
ERTY PURSUANT TO HIS PRIOR UNDERSTANDING WITH THE FAMILY 
AND HIS IMPROVEMENTS MADE ON THE PROPERTY OVER A PERIOD 
OF TWENTY (20) YEARS. THAT INTEREST AND UNDERSTANDING 
WAS MEMORIAL! ZED AND DEFINED BY THE AGREEMENT IN QUES· 
TION. IT WAS NOT REVOCABLE. 
The Agreement, the Revocable Trust and the two (2) notic' 
of revocation of the Trust constitute all of the evidence int 
case. Defendant-Respondent proposes to file copies of the A' 
ment and the Revocable Trust with his brief so that the Court 
have them before it when it considers such briefs on this case 
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Accordingly, Defendant-Respondent will resist extensive quotation 
from those agreements. 
The essence of Plaintiff's claim is that because the first 
paragraph of the Agreement provided for the establishment of a 
Revocable 'Trust, the balance of the Agreement provided only for 
the definition of the terms of such Revocable Trust, all of which 
was to be revocable at the whim of Plaintiff. Plaintiff had the 
burden of proof at trial. Her position has to be that a bare read-
ing of the Agreement and Trust Agreement compels the result she 
claims. Since Plaintiff is the Appellant herein, her position must 
further be that reasonable men could not disagree, except that such 
reading compels that result. 
Defendant-Respondent contends the opposite; that a reading 
of the documents compels the decision reached by the trial court. 
If the situation were reversed, Defendant-Respondent would claim 
that reasonable men could not find otherwise. 
It is entirely consistent to provide for a revocable trust 
as a management device to husband the property and at the same 
time to memorialize and define Defendant-Respondent's interest in 
the property. 
It would be inconsistent to recite and define Defendant-
Respondent 's interest in the property only to provide that such 
interest is revocable at the whim of Plaintiff. Plaintiff is 
essentially asking the Court to conclude that the trial court 
could not conclude other than that Defendant-Respondent made a 
contract that not only gave Plaintiff the right to declare such 
contract a nullity, but more importantly, that it gave Plaintiff 
-7-
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the right to declare Defendant-Respondent's prior 
conceded in:: 
est in the property a nullity. 
There is no provision in the Agreement or in the Revocat 
Trust that constitutes a grant of Defendant-Respondent• s interc 
in the property (acquired by his improvements and the prior unco 
standing) to Plaintiff or to the Trust in a way that would ca. 
such interest to revert to Plaintiff upon the revocation of the 
Trust, as urged by Plaintiff. 
Defendant-Respondent's right to purchase and his right o: 
first refusal are inconsistent with and unnecessary if Plainti:-
could simply annul the contract at her whim, as urged by Plaint: 
Most importantly, the limitation of Plaintiff's right to 
or dispose of the real property un ti 1 she consumes the rest of·. 
property and the limitation of her right to prefer one of her c: 
dren over the others is inconsistent with and unnecessary and r:. 
ingless if Plaintiff was empowered to annul those limitations c: 
her authority at her whim, as urged by Plaintiff. 
The specific Agreement that Plaintiff is entitled to use 0 
consume all of the property, including this property, upon cer'.c 
conditions is meaningless if the construction of the Agreement 
urged by Plaintiff is accepted. 
The fact that the Agreement and the Revocable Trust were" 
signed contemporaneously is significant. (The Agreement is dat: 
the 7th day of September, 1973 and the Revocable Trust is datec 
the 7th day of November, 1973.) If the parties intended ~~ 
Plaintiff could annul the Agreement at her whim, it would ~w 
· most i,,:: been necessary to protect that essential,overwhelming, · 
-8-
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tant of all rights by having the Revocable Trust executed contem-
poraneously with the Agreement. 
That there are two (2) Agreements signed at different times 
by different parties, belies the construction advanced by Plain-
tiff. The provision for revocation of the Revocable Trust did not 
say that the revocation of the Trust would have the effect of re-
voking the Agreement. On the contrary, the Revocable Trust is 
by its terms subject to the Agreement, but not vice versa. If 
the parties had intended the construction urged by Plaintiff, the 
convenient thing would have been simply to say in the Agreement 
that it was subject to the revocation provisions in the Revocable 
Trust, or even more logically to dispense with the Agreement alto-
gether and simply include the entire agreement of the parties in 
the Trust Agreement. But the parties made two (2) agreements. 
Defendant-Respondent urges: that the first was intended to define 
and describe Defendant-Respondent's interest in the property and 
Plaintiff's rights and responsibilities respecting the same; and 
that the second was intended to provide a means of caring for the 
property in Plaintiff's name. It was entirely logical to make the 
second Agreement (the Revocable Trust) revocable, but it would 
have made no sense at all to make the first one (the Agreement) 
revocable. Again, if the first one was intended to be revocable, 
it would have been easy to say so. While there is a signature of 
Defendant-Respondent on the Revocable Trust, it was an acceptance 
of the role as trustee. It stretches the imagination to say that 
by signing that acceptance to act as trustee, he was also agreeing 
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that the revocation of the Trust Agreement would nullify or o:: 
wise modify his interest in the property; yet that is e 
' xactly 
what Plaintiff asks us to do. On the other hand, if the 
cons:: 
tion advanced by Defendant-Respondent is correct, the requirerr: 
for two (2) contracts is obvious. The Revocable Trust is very 
different than the principal Agreement and it would have been 
inappropriate or at best very awkward to try to incorporate bot 
agreements into one document. 
The Revocable Trust itself provides that upon its termin:: 
the distribution shall be in equal shares, except as modified i:' 
accordance with the provisions of the principal Agreement (pm· 
graph 2 (e)) . 
Plain tiff's Exhibit 2 is a letter from Plain tiff's attor:.:: 
to Defendant-Respondent. It says: 
Dear Mr. Larrabee: 
This is to advise you, as one of the attorneys 
for your mother, that your mother has elected to re-
voke the Trust Agreement dated November 7, 1973 in 
which she is the Truster. This Trust, in my opinion, 
has never legally been put into effect by the recording 
of deeds, the setting up of trust accounts, or the like, 
but should it have had any validity, she has the right 
under Article 8 (VIII) to revoke the same. 
Defendant-Respondent points out that if there is no Trust, 
as urged by Plaintiff's attorney, there is no revocation, andi' 
there is no revocation, it is impossible to conclude there was 
a revocation of the principal Agreement. 
This writer finds it difficult to argue this matter with· 
out reciting his own testimony that Plaintiff's construction of 
the Agreement is not what the parties intended or that the inte 
· obvic'-pretation of Defendant-Respondent and the trial court 15 
-10-
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I 
what the parties did intend. Acknowledging the defectiveness of 
that form of argument, Defendant-Respondent points out that the 
trial court also felt strongly about the matter. see R 116, 
lines 5 through 12 wherein the following dialogue between the 
trial court and counsel for Plaintiff is recorded: 
THE COURT: She has a right to do anything 
she wants to with property having revoked the 
trust, subject to Glen's interest in the property 
under that agreement of September '73. 
MR. HASLAM: If that is the way you inter-
pret it, I suppose that is the way you interpret 
it. 
THE COURT: To me, it is so clear. I am sur-
prised you argue it otherwise. 
If there is a justification for Plaintiff's argument, and 
Defendant-Respondent does not concede there is, it appears to be 
that the provision for the creation of the Revocable Trust occurs 
in the first paragraph of the Agreement, thus allowing the infer-
ence that all subsequent paragraphs are in reality sub-paragraphs. 
But the paragraphs in the Agreement are numbered separately. Para-
graphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are each as independent as paragraph 1. 
The trial court so found. In its Findings and Conclusions, it re-
cited: (R 84 and 85) 
Findings of Fact 4. The Agreement and the Revocable 
Trust are separate documents, each of which is com-
plete on its face; each of which involves different 
parties; and each of which is separately executed. 
The Revocable Trust was executed approximately two (2) 
months after the Agreement. While the Revocable Trust 
was referred to in the Agreement and the Agreement was 
referred to and incorporated in the Revocable Trust, 
there is no provision in either document that makes one 
dependent on the other. 
I Conclusions of Law 3. The reference to and the incor-
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poration of the Agreement in the Revocable Trust 
was intended by the parties to make it clear that 
the dispositive provisions of the Revocable Trust 
were affected and modified by the terms of the 
Agreement. The Agreement and the Revocable Trust 
are each separate independent agreements, neither 
of which is dependent upon the other. The revoca-
tion of the Revocable Trust did not affect or re-
voke the Agreement. 
Plaintiff has urged at the top of page 5 of her brief t~. 
rule that the effect to be given a contract depends on ~e~ 
of the parties and that this is to be ascertained by looking: 
the entire contract and all of its parts in their relationshi: 
to each other. Defendant-Respondent concurs and urges thats· 
dard in the analysis of the Agreement here under consideratic: 
Defendant-Respondent has not cited any legal authority 
the presentation of this argument. It would be possible toe 
cases relating to the Plaintiff's burden of proof at trialu 
more importantly, to the Appellant's burden on appeal. This 
writer does not believe he can gainsay the Court's understand 
of those rules and will resist that compulsion. In the end, 
case involves the interpretation of the Agreement and the Re'. 
cable Trust. They and the two (2) notices relating to revoci 
were the only evidence before the trial court. That the det1 
mination of the intent of the parties as ascertained by look: 
at the entire contract is the task at hand is asserted by pJ, 
tiff and agreed to by Defendant-Respondent. That the dispu 
is entirely factual is itself significant. Everyone knows t 
facts have to be determined by the trier of fact, and his de 
~ination should stand unless clearly erroneous. 
-12-
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court found that the Agreement was valid and bind-
ing on the parties; that the Agreement and the Revocable Trust 
are separate independent Agreements; and that the revocation of 
the Trust did not revoke the Agreement. The trial judge felt 
strongly about that conclusion. He was right. 
Respectfully submitted, 
' ~(~l/{_,,~~ 
GERALD E. NIELSON 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
-13- r 
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~day of 
TRUST AGHEEMENT 
THfS THUST ACHEEI\l!ENT, made and enten:d into as of this 
I I 
( l.1 \ '-' - • (,. ~ -; 19__.lJ_, by and bdween REBECCA B. 
LAHRABEE, hereinafter called the 11 Trustor, 11 and OTTO BLAINE LARRABEE, 
JR., GLENWOOD B. LARRABEE am! WARREN H. LARHABEE, herinafter 
referred to jointly as "Trustee. 11 
WITN ESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the Trustor has assigned, transferred, conveyed and 
delivered or is about to assign, transfer, convey and deliver to the Trustee 
cPrtain property set forth and more particularly described in Exhibit "A", attached 
hereto and made a part hereof for the purposes hereinafter set forth. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises and cove-
nants herein contained the parties agree: 
ARTICLE I 
Trust Estate 
Trustor or any other person may make additional contributions 
of property to Trustee, in trust, by inter vivos or testamentary transfer and 
Trustee may in its discretion accept such property, in trust. The property 
described in ExhilJit "A 11 attached hereto, together with all other property that 
may be contributed to and accepted by Trustee, in trust, and together with all 
increments to, income from, and gain from the sale of or exchange of all property 
held by Trustee, in trust, and together with all other property coming into 
possession of Trustee by virtue of the sale, exchange, investment, reinvest-
mcnt or disposition or use of property held by the Trustee, in trust, shall 
constitute the trust estate and shall be held, invested, reim·ested, managed and 
distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Trust Agreement. 
ARTICLE II 
Dispositive Provisions 
Trustee shall distribute the income and principal of the trust as 
follows: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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1. f>uri11" tl1r~ Life of Tn1st"r. 
(a) Bc:ndits for Tr11stor. Tile T!'ustee shall pay to the Trustur 
1,"· iJu berwfi I s11ch arr1011nts from the [H'incipal or income of the trust es late as 
,r1e shall from time to time in writing direct. If Trustor becomes legally incom-
petent or otherwise unable to handle her affairs, Trustee shall pay to or for the 
benefit of Trustor, so much of the income and principal of the Trust Estate as 
Trustt>c in it.s discretion deems reasonably necessary or appropriate for the 
proper ma intc· na nee, care and support of Trustor. 
2. At the Death of Trustor. 
(a) Death.Taxes, Costs, and Expenses. Trustee shall use so 
much of the income and principal of the trust as is necessary to pay the expenses 
of the last illness, funeral and burial of Trustor, all taxes that may arise because 
of Trustor's death, and all other just claims against Trustor's estate. 
(b) Terminatio11. The: Trust shall terminate upon the death 
of Trustor· 01· on the first clay of September, 1976, whichever last occurs; or 
when the Trust estate shall have been completely consumed in accordance with 
the provisions of this Trust Agreement. 
(c) Distribution Upon Termination. Upon the termination of 
the Trust, Trustee shall distribute the residue of the Trust estate to MARY 
DOROTHY POULSEN, MARGAHET IO'\E AITKEN, GERALDI~E L. HOGAN, 
CORNELIA L. !IAN COCK, OTTO BLAINE LARRABEE, .TR., GLENWOOD B. 
LARH!\BEE; and WAR KEN H. LARHABEE, or if any of said persons are deceased 
to tho s•irviviiig issue> of them by right of representation, in equal shares pro-
viued that said equal shai·cs shall be modified in accordance \1ith the provisions 
of an Agreeme11t between the Trustor and her children dated the --- day of 
19 __ . (A copy of which agreement is attached to this Trust 
Ai.;reement and hy rcft•rence is incorporated herein.) 
powers: 
ARTICLE III 
Powers of Trustee 
t Trustee shall have the following In the administration of the trus • 
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1. To huld as part of the trust estate all of the stock in any cor-
pili,tlion \"hid1 r11;1y cnttt<: illto his hands. If the shares of stock in any corp(Jcation 
1,.:ld [,y Tn1s1ce slu.11 he a majority of its total outstanding \Oting stock, Trustee 
1n:iy use such stock control to continue the corporation's business for such time 
~nd in such rnallncr as Trustee may deern advisable. In Trustee's discretion, 
thr kind of l>usincss in which the corporation is engaged may he changed and the 
"cope and natur·e of its activities enlarged or diminished, or it may be dissolved 
and its assets liquidated. Trustee shall have, respecting the corporation's busi-
n~ss and its stock owned by Trustee, all the powers of a natural person. Trustee 
is authorized, but not required to vote stock held by Trustee in such a way as to 
elect Trustee as a member of the Board of Directors of the corpora tic,11. In the 
absence of actual notice to the contrary, Trustee may accept as correct, financial 
and other statements rendered by such corporations from time to time as to their 
conclilion and operations. The corporation shall be regarded as an entity separate 
from the trust. 
2. To hold any property received at the inception of the trust or 
subsequently added to it or acquired by it pursuant to proper authority as long as 
Trustee, in the exercise of reason;ible prudt.:nce, discretion and intelligence, 
may deem retention to be in the best interests of the trust estate. 
3. To manage, control, sell, convey, exchange, partition, divide, 
suhdivide, improve, repair; to grant options and sell on deferred payments 
pr·operty, real or personal in the trust estate; to lease for terms within or extend-
ing beyond the dur-ation of the trust for any purpose, including exploration for 
and rernoval of gas, oil and other minerals; and to create restrictions, easements, 
and other servitudes. 
4. To compromise, arbitrate, or otherwise adjust claims in favor 
of en· against the trust. 
ti. To invest funds of the trust estate in such properties, whether 
, , ' nlit tlie 1· n"estment of trust funds, as men of prudence, dtt\ltnri:cecl by the law for • 
discTetion and intelligence purchase for their own account, having regard not to 
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'i";cuL11iOJ• but tu tlw perm:i.nent disriusitir~ri of lheic fu!lds diicl considering the 
pt"l,tlilc incrnne as well as tile prob;ible safety of their capital; including but not 
IJ.·· i·my "r 11111Ll;:ilion, real property or i11terests therein, corporate bonds and 
Jclwnturcs, slucks, pn·ferred or common, and participations in a common trust 
fund. 
6. To borrow money for any trust puqiose upon such terms and 
conditions as Trustee may deem proper, and to obligate the trust estate for 
repayment; to encumber the trust estate or any of its property by mortgage, 
deed of trust, pledge or otherwise. 
7. To have, respecting securities, all the rights, powers, and 
privileges of an owner, including the power to give proxies, and to pay assess-
ments and other sums deemed by Trustee to be necessary for the protection of 
the trust estate; to participate in voting trust, pooling agreements, foreclosures, 
l'eorganizations, consolidations, mergers, and liquidations, and in connection 
therewith to deposit securities with and transfer title to any protective or other 
committee under s11ch terms as Trustee may deem advisable; to exercise or sell 
stock subscriptions or conversion rights; to accept and retain as an investment all 
securities or· other property received through the exercise of any of the foregoing 
powers. 
8. To determine what is principal and what is income of the trust 
and to apportion and allocate in its discretion receipts and expenses as between 
Pl'incipa 1 and income. 
9. To hold securities or other properties in the trust estate in 
his name as Trustee hereunder or in his own name or in the name of his nominee, 
and to hold such securities unregistered in such condition that ownership will 
µass by delivery. 
T o carry insurance of such kinds and in such amounts as 1 o. 
r1·11sti'e rnay deem advisable at the expense of the trust; to insure against loss 
IJ.1 fin: or other cause any of the property constituting a part of the trust estate, 
s 0 any other trust estate hai.ing a common interest or 
· PZtrately or together with 
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"!illc;:tlioli, and to Jl3Y f"1· such in::;urance Otlt of the princiral or income of the 
lll n·sto1·i11g ui· rqlai l'ing tl1e property constituting the trust estate, unli;s,, the 
pul'puse of th<' trust wou1d be best served by making the proceeds of said insurance 
a p;.irt of the pr·incip:il uf the trust, as determined by Trustee in its discretion. 
11. To commence or defend such litigation '"ith respect to the 
trust or any rt·operty of the trust estatr> as Trustee may deem ad\·isable at the 
e>.pense of the trust. 
12. To loan or advance Trustee's own funds to the trust for any 
rurpose thereof at the then current rate of interest, and any such loan or ad,·a11ce, 
together with interest, shall be a first lien against the trust estate and shall be 
repaid therefrom. Trustee is authorized to deal \1·ith any indebtedness, liability, 
or obligation due to or from the trust and in connection therewith Trustee may 
m:1k1' such extensions, compromises or other agreements relative thereto as 
Trustee rn its discretion may approve. 
13. All taxes, asse;:;srnents, debts, and charges and other expenses 
i11currPd by Trustee in the administrati0!1 or protection of the trust estate, 
including compensation for Trustee or any other services, shall be a charge 
upon the trust estate and shall be paid by Trustee out of principal or out of in-
come, or partially out of each, in such manner and proportion as Trustee in its 
absolute discretion, may determine to be advisable. 
14. To operate solely or in conjunction with others any business 
or enteqirise, whether it be an individual business, general or limited partner-
ship, or c:nqioratir,ns, for so long a tinie and in such manner as it deems proper 
for the best ir1tcrcsts of the trust estate. 
15. To ernp1oy attorneys, accountants, agents, and brokers 
1Taso 11 :rbly 11c;cessary in the administration of the trust arid to engage the services 
f . t . d reprcsentati,·es as may be necessary 
c, e1r1ployccs, super1ntendi;nts, agen s, an 
JI app1 uprialc for conducting any business or enterprise. 
16. 
. · ents of income or principal to any To distribute any paym 
f . . who is not of full legal capacity, by making minor beneficiary, or any bene 1c1ary 
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:ui.' sucil Jisl r·lln1li,>11 Jircclly to such beneficiary, or by arplying the distribution 
for the b"11C'fit of such beneficiary, or by depositing cash distribution into a 
,;·,,ings :tcCtJ1111t of any neputable bank in the name of the beneficiary, and all 
di~tributions so made or applied shall be distributions of the Trust estate and a 
full discharge of Trustee. 
17. At the time of any partial or final distributions of the Trust 
estate, to partition, allot and distribute the Trust estate in undi\·ided interests, 
or in kind, or partly in money and partly in kind, at valuations determined by 
the trustee, which determination shall be conclusive on all parties concerned 
and to sell such property as the Trustee may deem necessa:-y to make division 
or distribution. 
18. To reimburse Trustee from income or principal or both of 
the Trust estate for any loss, liability or expense incurred by reason of Trustee's 
holding any property received or held in trust. 
Unless specifically limited, all discretions conferred upon Trustee 
shall be absolute and their exercise conclusive on all persons interested in the 
Trust estate. The enumeration of certain powers of Trustee shall not limit the 
general powers, Trustee being vested with and having all the rights, powers, 
privileges and immunities which an absolute owner of the same property would 
have in order to further the trust purposes. 
ARTICLE IV 
Compensation of Trustee 
The Trustee, other than a corporate trustee, as hereinafter pro-
vi ded, shall not be entitled to receive compensation prove de cl that the indi viduab 
acting as trustee will be entitled to reasonable compensation on an hourly basis 
together with reasonable mileage for services which they render in their indi-
vidual capacities to the trustee. If a corporate trustee is appointed, such trustee 
r)ia· 11 l l amounts as are currently charged by persons 
'' >e entitled to receive sue 1 
· ·1 t t of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
'J'· u1stit11tio11s 3 cting as trustees of s1n11 ar rus s 
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AHl'ICLE V 
Successor Trustee 
If tl1c Tr·uslee herein named resigns as Tru;;tee or is otherwise 
unaLlc or unwilling to or fails to sccvc as Trustee, Trustor he;reby nominates 
and appoints VALLEY BAN£<. & TRLST CO,\IPANY of Salt Lake City, Utah, as 
successor truske and its successors and assigns are nominated and appointed 
a~ suLsequent successor trustees. 
If a single trustee resigns or is unwilling or fails to serve as 
trustee, another trustee may be nominated who is a blood member of the REBECCA 
LARHABEI·: family to serve in such trustee's place with the written concurrence 
of the trustor. If two trustees resign or are unwilling or fail to serve as trustees, 
two other trustees may be nominated v.ho are blood members of the REBECCA 
LARRABEE family to serve in such trustees' place, with the written concurrence 
of the tr us tor. 
ARTICLE VI 
Majol'ity Contcol of Trust0cs 
In the c\·ent all of the trustees do not agree on any action or 
matter, a sirnµle majority will control. Such majority will be entitled to do 
a11ything or take any action the trustee can do or take as herein provided. 
ARTICLE vrr 
Spendthrift Provision 
No beneficiary under this Trust Agreement shall have the power 
to pledge, assign, mortgage, sell or in any other· manner transfer or hypothecate 
any interest which such be11eficiary may ha\·e or may expect to have in any 
. 11 b r· . have any power in income or principal of the trust; nor sha any ene ic1ary 
any manner to anticipate, charge, or encumber his or her interest either in 
· l · t t of ny beneficiary be liable or 
rncorne or in µrincipal; nor shall sue l u1 eres a 
.'-'ubjc!ct to in any manner while in the possession of Trustee for the debts, con-
ILwt.c·, 1 l ·1·t· e ents obligations or torts of such beneficiary. 
- ., 1;1 JL 1 ies, engag-'m , 
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I 
ARTICLE vrn 
Powl't' of T1·u~>to1· to Arncnd or Revoke 
Nutwithsbnding anything in this Trust Agreentent to the contra,-y, 
Trustor will l1avcc tlte right at any time or times to amend any of the provisions 
of thi:o Trust Agreement or to amend any amendment thereto by an instrument 
in writing executed by Trustor and delin~red to Trustee; prodded, however, that 
Trustor shall not have power to amend the Trust Agreement, in such a way as 
to increase the duties of Trustee or to impose any additional burdens on him, 
ll'lthout the consc:nt of Trustee. Trustor shall have the right at any time or times 
to revoke this Trust Agreement in whole or in part, by an instrument in writing 
executed by Trustor and delivered to Trustee, upon paying all sums due to Trustee 
and indemnifying Trustee against loss from liabilities lawfully incurred in the 
administration of the trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Rebecca B. Larrabee, Trustor, and 
Otto Blaine Larrabee, Jr., Glenwood B. Larrabee, and Warren H. Larrabee, 
Trustees, have executed this Trust Agreement as of the day and year first above 
written. 
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REBECCA B. LARRABEE 
GLENWOOD B. LARRABEE 
/~ j /' . 11-t f/ti2~'4l j_ . /,aM ~ 
WARREN H. LARRABEE 
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-- EXIIIBI'f "A" 
of the stack af Royal Dairy a~d af the fallowins described 
rc:'il pl'operty lFcreinafter refer:ced to as "the P1· .1perty11 : 
Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, of Block 
2, Dieter and Jo~nson, Main Street 
Addition, as recorded in the Office 
of the Salt L~ke County Recorder, 
together \·1ith all i:.1pravements thereon. 
more co111mo;1ly known as 1501 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
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